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Abstract
The emerging network-enabled medical devices impose new challenges for the safety assurance
of medical cyber-physical systems (MCPS). In this paper, we present a case study of building a
high-level safety argument for a patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) closed-loop system, with the
purpose of exploring potential methodologies for assuring the safety of MCPS.
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1 Introduction
Medical devices are increasingly used to deliver critical therapies. Because many devices
are used to control the release of chemicals or energy into the patient, the safety of such
devices are very important. In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
must approve each medical device before it can be marketed. The purpose of this approval
process is to ensure that each device meets an acceptable level of safety. The approval
process presents challenges to all parties involved. If a company fails to obtain approval for
a new device they will not be able to market it and will not be able to make a return on
their investment. For the FDA considerable resources are devoted to analyzing submissions
and determining if approval should be granted. Therefore, there is a need to effectively
communicate and review the safety of medical device systems with a range of stakeholders
(e.g., medical device manufacturers and regulatory authorities). The assurance case, which is
a method for expressing an argument about some properties of the system is a good way to
justify the safety of medical device systems. In fact, the FDA issued a draft guidance [11] in
2010 suggesting that medical manufacturers of infusion pumps provide a safety assurance
case with their pre-market submissions.
There are many challenges for both manufacturers and reviewers (i.e., regulatory bodies)
when it comes to effective application of the assurance case approach: for example, how
can one ensure that the argument presented by an assurance case is valid (e.g., logically
consistent)? How can one justify the confidence of evidence used? How can one evaluate
the sufficiency of an assurance case? Recently, research into assurance cases for medical
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devices has been increasing. For instance, Weinstock and Goodenough [12] discussed the
safety case construction of generic infusion pumps; Jee et al. [4] constructed a safety case
for a pacemaker; Ayoub et al. [2] proposed a safety pattern for model-based development,
and applied it to a case study of generic Patient-Controlled Analgesic (PCA) infusion pump
software.
Recent technological advancements impose additional challenges for assuring the safety of
medical device systems. There is an emerging trend of network-enabled medical devices which
can communicate and coordinate with each other during the treatment, forming medical
cyber-physical systems (MCPS). New functionalities such as closed-loop continuous care,
which was not possible with stand-alone devices, are now being developed. However, MCPS
also bring new hazards (e.g., network failure) to patient safety, adding more concerns for the
safety argument in assurance cases.
In this paper, we consider a patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) closed-loop system, which
is an example of MCPS, and build a high-level safety argument for it. The purpose of this
case study is to explore potential methodologies for assuring the safety of MCPS. For the rest
of the paper, we introduce the background of PCA closed-loop system in Section 2, present
our safety argument in Section 3, and draw conclusions in Section 4.
2 Background: PCA Closed-Loop System
PCA infusion pumps are commonly used to deliver pain medication to patients who are
experiencing high levels of pain due to serious physical trauma (e.g., surgery). Patients often
have different tolerance levels for pain and different reactions to the medication. Therefore,
in addition to delivering opioids with a fixed schedule programmed by a caregiver, the PCA
pump also allows the patient to request an additional dose of medication (called bolus) by
pressing a button. A well-known hazard with opioid medication is that an overdose can cause
respiratory failure, which may be fatal to patients [8]. There are some safety mechanisms
built into modern PCA pumps. For example, a PCA pump can be programmed with limits
on the number of doses it will deliver, which helps to avoid overdose no matter how often the
patient pushes the bolus button. However, the existing safety mechanisms are not sufficient
to protect patients in all clinical scenarios and a large number of adverse events involving
PCA pumps have been reported [9]. The causes of patients receiving overdose include, but
are not limited to, the following:
the pump is misprogrammed,
the wrong concentration of drug is loaded into the pump,
a caregiver overestimates the maximum dose the patient can receive,
PCA-by-proxy, i.e., someone other than the patient presses the bolus button.
Obviously, there is still certain risk associated with the use of PCA pumps, to which we refer
as the residual risk of standalone pumps.
To mitigate the overdose hazard, clinicians must monitor the patient’s respiratory function
through vital sign sensor readings (e.g., blood oxygen saturation measured by a pulse
oximeter). Then, if the patient entered respiratory distress, the caregiver would manually
intervene to resucitate the patient. Unfortunately the current practice is both error prone
and burdensome for the clinician [3, 5].
Recently, the notion of a “closed-loop” PCA system has been proposed to ease the burden
of clinicians by interconnecting the infusion pump, pulse oximeter, and a computer controller
over a network. The controller would monitor the pulse oximeter readings and, when a
problem is detected, automatically stop the infusion pump and alert the clinician.
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Figure 1 PCA closed-loop system overview (adapted from [7]).
Figure 1 shows the architecture and essential data flow of a PCA closed-loop system. A
pulse oximeter receives physiological signals from a clip on the patient’s finger and calculates
the SpO2 values (i.e., the measure of blood oxygenation). The computer controller makes
control decisions based on SpO2 readings received from the pulse oximeter, and periodically
issues a “ticket” to the infusion pump. Each ticket limits the bolus and basal time period
that the pump can infuse before the patient could possibly be pushed into respiratory distress.
If the network becomes disconnected for a long period, the pump would expire the current
ticket and stop delivering pain medication to protect the patient from overdose. Unless the
ticket expires or the pump is stopped by the controller, the infusion pump will continue to
deliver opioids to the patient at the basal rate programmed by the caregiver. The patient
may also occasionally press the button and request a bolus from the infusion pump. After
the absorption of the opioid medication, the patient’s respiratory state may become more
depressed, which is reflected by the patient’s blood oxygenation level. The safety of such
a closed-loop system has been studied in [1, 10] via simulation-based analysis and formal
verification.
3 Safety Argument
In this section, we develop a high-level safety argument for the PCA closed-loop system.
Figure 2 shows our argument using the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), a popular graphical
notation for organizing and presenting safety argument (we refer readers who are unfamiliar
with GSN to [6]).
The top-level goal (G1) is to show that “The PCA closed-loop system is at least as safe
as the stand-alone infusion pump, with respect to the overdose hazard”. Here, we assume
that the closed-loop system is built on top of a stand-alone infusion pump whose safety has
already been assessed in a separate safety argument, and the pulse oximeter’s behavior is not
affected by putting in the PCA closed-loop. This context is documented as C1.1 in Figure 2.
To address G1, our strategy is to argue by risk-benefit analysis (S1), which is defined in
the context C1.2. If the benefit brought by the closed-loop system outweighs its introduced
risk, then we can assert that the goal G1 is true. More specifically, the benefit refers to how
much residual risk of the stand-alone pump can be mitigated by the closed-loop system.
Following strategy S1, we decompose G1 into three sub-goals:
G2.1: The introduced risk due to hazards of closed-loop system is acceptable.
G2.2: Some residual risk of the stand-alone infusion pump is adequately mitigated by the
closed-loop system.
G2.3: The benefit of closed-loop system outweighs its introduced risk.
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In Figure 2, we only further develop G2.1 as an example, while keep G2.2 and G2.3
undeveloped (denoted by a diamond underneath the rectangle element). In the following, we
elaborate on G2.1 in more details and propose possible strategies for G2.2 and G2.3.
The strategy (S2.1) for claiming goal G2.1 is to argue over a list of possible hazards
introduced by the closed-loop system, under the context (C2.1) that lists introduced hazards.
This strategy leads to four sub-goals, each of which corresponds to a hazard of the closed-loop
system. In Figure 2, these four goals (G3.1-G3.4) are not further developed. We briefly
discuss their corresponding hazards as follows.
(G3.1) Delivering a wrong ticket to the infusion pump. This hazard may be caused by
incorrect controller computation, corruption of the message on the network, or incorrect
sensor readings. We may argue that the risk of this hazard is small by providing formal
verification evidence for the correctness of the controller algorithm. Another useful
evidence is the verification of the infusion pump. If the pump correctly handles tickets
arriving from the network interface, tickets cannot make the pump infuse when it would
not be infusing in the stand-alone case, or infuse at a different rate. That is, at any time,
the pump would be infusing at the same rate as it would be infusing in the stand-alone
case, unless it has been stopped by an expired ticket. Therefore, a bad ticket would not
cause more overdose than in the stand-alone case, if the pump handles the ticket correctly.
(G3.2) Not delivering a ticket to the pump. Various reasons may cause this hazard. For
example, the controller does not produce a ticket when it should, due to an incorrect
implementation or incorrect sensor reading; or the calculated ticket is lost, due to
disconnected network or other failures. In any case, the infusion will continue unmodified
until the prescription runs out or the current ticket expires. Thus, this hazard would
not introduce additional risk because the patient receives exactly the same amount of
medication as in the stand-alone case.
(G3.3) The pump has a wrong interpretation of the ticket. Recall that a ticket contains
the maximum time period over which the infusion pump can infuse, a ticket that does
not expire when it should due to the pump’s wrong interpretation may lead to overdose.
Similar to the argument for G3.1, we can provide the formal verification of the pump as
evidence to show that the risk of hazard is small.
(G3.4) Caregiver behavior adaptation. For example, due to the automation of closed-loop
system, the caregiver may check the pump alarm state and assess the patient condition
less frequently than in the stand-alone case. Or, the caregiver learns to assume that the
system will self-correct and therefore applies more aggressive therapy. The argument
about this hazard relies on the caregiver’s training. Training materials and guidelines
will be used as evidence. In additional, a sufficiently reliable new alarm system must be
present to detect closed-loop system failure and notify caregivers.
We can argue goal G2.2 in a similar way as for G2.1, that is, arguing over residual risk
of the stand-alone pump that can be mitigated by the closed-loop system. As described
in Section 2, the residual risks include, for example, the pump being misprogrammed, the
wrong concentration of drug being loaded into the pump, a caregiver overestimating the
maximum dose the patient can receive, or someone other than the patient pressing the bolus
button. These hazards can be adequately mitigated in the closed-loop system due to the fact
that, the controller would automatically monitor the patient’s respiratory function via pulse
oximeter readings and automatically stop the infusion pump whenever necessary to protect
the patient from overdose.
Finally, goal G2.3 takes a holistic view of benefit and risk of the closed-loop system.
Essentially, we want to show that the benefit of the closed-loop system (i.e., mitigating
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residual risk of the stand-alone pump) outweighs its introduced risk. A formal risk-benefit
analysis report can be used as evidence to support this goal.
4 Conclusions
We have presented a high-level safety argument for a patient-controlled analgesia (PCA)
closed-loop system, where an infusion pump, a pulse oximeter, and a computer controller
are interconnecting over a network. The goal of the argument is to show that “The PCA
closed-loop system is at least as safe as the stand-alone infusion pump, with respect to the
overdose hazard”, and the strategy is to argue by risk-benefit analysis. This case study has
the potential of being generalized for other network-enabled medical devices. We hope to
further explore this direction in the future. Ultimately, we would like to develop a safety
argument pattern for closed-loop systems.
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